Empirical facts characterizing banking crises: an analysis via binary
  time series by Di Caro, Paolo et al.
Empirical facts characterizing banking crises: an analysis via binary 
time series1 
Paolo Di Caro1, Giuseppe Pernagallo2, Antonino Damiano Rossello3 and Benedetto Torrisi4  
 
1 Department of Finance, Italian Ministry of Economy and Finance; Rome, Italy. (email: 
paolo.dicaro@uniroma1.it) 
2 Department of Economics and Business, University of Catania (corresponding author, e-mail: 
giuseppepernagallo@yahoo.it) 
3 Department of Economics and Business, University of Catania (e-mail: rossello@unict.it) 
4 Department of Economics and Business, University of Catania (e-mail: btorrisi@unict.it) 
 
Abstract 
Various works have already showed that common shocks and cross-country financial linkages caused 
the banking systems of several countries to be highly interconnected with the result that during bad 
times, banking crises may arise simultaneously in different countries. Our aim is to provide further 
evidence on the topic using a dataset made by dichotomous banking crises time series for 66 countries 
from 1800 to 2014. Via the use of heatmap matrices we show that several countries exhibit pairwise 
correlation, which means that banking crises tend to occur in the same year. Clustering analysis 
suggests that developed countries (for the most European ones) are highly similar in terms of the path 
of events. An analysis of the events that followed the Great Depression and the Great Recession 
shows that after the crisis of 2008, banking crises tend to characterize countries tied by financial links 
whereas before 2008 contagion seems to affect countries in the same geographical area. Clustering 
analysis shows also that after financial liberalization crises affected countries with similar economic 
structures and growth. Further researches should enlighten the origin of these linkages investigating 
how the process of contagion eventually happens.   
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1 Please do not quote without permission from the authors. 
1. Introduction 
The research question of this paper is straightforward: are banking crises in different countries 
associated? Various works have already showed that common shocks and cross-country financial 
linkages caused the banking systems of several countries to be highly interconnected (Bordo and 
Murshid, 2001; Neal and Weidenmier, 2003; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2013) with the result that during 
bad times, banking crises may arise simultaneously in different countries. Our aim is to provide 
further evidence on the topic using a big panel dataset. The period covered by our data goes from 
1800 to 2014 for 66 countries; the series investigated are binary series classified with a 1 if a banking 
crisis occurred, 0 otherwise.  
   The methodology applied in this paper is intuitive: we first tested via runs test if randomness played 
any role in the sequence of events for each series, we then computed the pairwise correlation 
coefficients (for binary data) and tested their significance, presenting this huge number of coefficients 
via heatmap matrices. Via a chi-square test we found that there is no association between the intensity 
of correlation (moderate or strong) and the fact that the considered countries are in the same Continent 
or not. Finally, clustering analysis consented us to evidence group of nations similar in terms of the 
occurrence of banking crises assessing also how the two major financial crises and financial 
liberalization affected the considered countries.   
   The paper is structured as it follows. Section 2 briefly defines banking crises and what are the 
common causes provided in the literature. Section 3 shows the results of our analysis. The final 
section concludes. 
2. Banking crises: definition and aetiology 
The principal categories of risks faced by banks are credit risk (assets turn bad and ceasing to 
perform), liquidity risk (withdrawals exceed the available funds), and interest rate risk (fluctuations 
in the interest rate can reduce the value of bonds held by the bank). These risks, if not correctly 
managed by banks, can be source of financial instability.  
   There is not a unanimous definition of banking crisis (Chaudron and Haan, 2014). As pointed out 
by the Word Bank, a (systemic) banking crisis can be defined as the situation of many banks in a 
country that experience solvency or liquidity problems simultaneously. When this situation occurs, 
the financial sector of that country is characterized by several defaults of financial institutions, and a 
large part of the institutions face the impossibility or the difficulty of repaying contracts on time. 
Calomiris (2010, p. 4) defines banking crisis as “panics or waves of bank failures”. Another definition 
concerns the side of capital, so a banking crisis identifies a situation of a large depletion of the banking 
system capital (Caprio and Klingebiel, 1996; Laeven and Valencia, 2008; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009; 
Laeven, 2011).  
   The causes of a banking crisis can be different (Laeven, 2011). An important role is played by bank 
runs and bank panic. If depositors of a bank suspect the bank to fail, they can rush to withdraw their 
deposits; if too many depositors follow the same behaviour, the bank can be forced to liquidate its 
assets until failure (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983). When many bank runs occur at the same time and 
concern different banks, we talk of bank panic, which results are catastrophic and cause the failure 
of many financial institutions. Bank runs are closely related to the irrational side of depositors: the 
fear that the other depositors can withdrawn their funds causing the bank to fail, triggers the run even 
if the bank is financially stable (self-fulfilling prophecies). In order to prevent this fear, nowadays the 
international normative provides several protections for depositors such as higher reserve 
requirements for banks and deposit guarantees.  
   Others think that banking crises are the natural consequence of the procyclicality of the financial 
system (Gorton, 1988), so during upturn of the economic cycle, credit grows consistently whereas 
during the downturn there is a collapse in credit. These theories are linked to economic fundamentals 
and can be thought as the opposite of theories that justify banking crisis as the consequence of 
bubbles. Asset price bubbles exist when “the market price of an asset exceeds its price determined by 
fundamental factors by a significant amount for a prolonged period” (Evanoff, Kaufman and 
Malliaris, 2012), a situation that cannot be adequately explained by traditional theories and clearly in 
contrast with the assumption of informational efficiency.   
   Frauds can also be source of banking crises. Fraudulent behaviour can cause the failure of several 
banks, which in turns triggers a banking crisis. Some remarkable examples were the crises of 
Venezuela in 1994 and in the Dominican Republic in 2003 (Laeven, 2011).  
   Finally, given the fact that many banks over the world are interconnected, financial contagion is 
another source of crises: the failure of large intermediaries in one country can cause the failures of 
other intermediaries in other countries. Financial contagion can be thought as a sort of “domino 
effect” (Freixas, Laeven and Peydrò, 2015), in the sense that the failure of a bank can cause failures 
of other intermediaries. The magnitude of this effect depends on the overall macroeconomic and 
financial environment and can be detrimental for the banking system since it increases the probability 
of default of an intermediary and the fragility of the financial system (Freixas, Laeven and Peydrò, 
2015; for a definition of financial fragility see Lagunoff and Schreft, 2001). Freixas, Laeven and 
Peydrò (2015) stated that contagion can start via seven channels. Among these, our work provides 
evidence regarding the channel of cross-country contagion. The recent financial crisis has been 
challenging to economists because of its multiple-country nature showing a systemic crisis in a single 
“small” country is completely different from a worldwide systemic crisis. Due to financial 
environments highly interconnected, a crisis can boost in a country and spreads quickly in other 
countries. The evidence supporting the relationship between banks over the word is well documented. 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2013, p. 4561) pointed out that in the late-2000s crisis, the origin of the 
widespread financial instability was due to “common shocks (the bursting of the global housing 
bubble) and cross-country linkages (for example, because many countries bought US subprime 
mortgage debt)”. Other authors (Bordo and Murshid, 2001; Neal and Weidenmier, 2003) showed the 
existence of cross-country correlations in banking crises also during the period 1880–1913. Kalemli-
Ozcan, Papaioannou, and Perri (2013), using a sample of 20 developed countries, showed that 
countries more interconnected with the United States experienced more synchronized output cycles 
with the United States during the financial crisis of 2008.  In this paper we want to extent the evidence 
in favour of cross-country linkages in banking crises assessing whether a relationship between crises 
in different countries exists and whether this eventual relationship can be considered statistically 
significant. 
   The novelty of our work is clear: we provide evidence in favour of the fact that banking crises occur 
simultaneously using a big panel dataset, including countries with different economic and social 
structures. Furthermore, we show how these crises tend to interest clusters of countries that present 
economic or political ties, investigating also the differences occurred with respect to the two major 
financial crises (1929 and 2008) and after the financial liberalization in 1990s.  
 
 
3. Data and results 
As pointed out by Chaudron and Haan (2014), recent researches on banking crises generally use as 
sources for dating banking crises the works of Caprio et al. (2005), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and 
Laeven and Valencia (2008, 2013). These databases consider a (systemic) banking crisis when 
exceptional events or policy measures occur.  
   The dataset used in this study is available on the website of Harvard Business School. These data 
(collected over many years by Carmen Reinhart, Ken Rogoff, Christoph Trebesch, and Vincent 
Reinhart) include banking crises for several countries from 1800 to 2014. The dataset is made by 
binary time series taking value of 1 when a banking crisis occurred, 0 otherwise. The 66 countries 
used in this study are reported in Table 1. The United Kingdom and United States are the countries 
with the highest number of banking crises (both 33), whereas the countries with the lowest number 
of crises are Singapore and Mauritius with only 1 banking crisis in more than 200 years. The most 
nefarious year in terms of number of crises was the 1995, with 26 banking crises over the world; the 
first advanced-economy banking crisis in the considered period occurred in 1802 in France, whereas 
the first emerging markets interested by the phenomenon were India, China and Peru (Reinhart and 
Rogoff, 2013).  
   The first hypothesis to verify is whether the sequence of events for each country  follows a 
random path. The binary series is made of a sequence of 0s and 1s; in such cases the nonparametric 
runs test is a common methodology used to test the randomness of a series. A run can be defined as 
an unbroken sequence of similar events or like objects (Bradley, 1960). For example, in the series 
AABABBBAA there are five runs: one run of A's of length 1, two runs of A's of length 2, one run of 
B's of length 1 and one run of B's of length 3. If the outputs A and B are randomly distributed, we 
should not recognize any pattern in the series. We tested if the occurrence of banking crises in a 
country follows a random pattern (null hypothesis) or a determined pattern, i.e. the sequence of events 
is not casual (alternative hypothesis). Performing this test before we compute the correlation matrix 
is important to exclude any role of randomness in the sequence of events, which may cause spurious 
correlation.  
   Table 2 shows the results of the test reporting both an exact p-value and a p-value obtained via 
approximation. For almost every country we can reject the null hypothesis of randomness of the series 
concluding that the occurrence of banking crises is not casually distributed, however, the null 
hypothesis cannot be rejected for Guatemala, whereas there is contrasting evidence for the Dominican 
Republic, Honduras, Mauritius and Singapore (it should be noted that the low number of crises of 
these countries may affected the result of the test). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Countries used for the empirical analysis.  
Country Label Country Label 
Algeria DZA Kenya KEN 
Angola AGO Korea KOR 
Argentina ARG Malaysia MYS 
Australia AUS Mauritius MUS 
Austria AUT Mexico MEX 
Belgium BEL Morocco MAR 
Bolivia BOL Myanmar MMR 
Brazil BRA Netherlands NLD 
Canada CAN New Zealand NZL 
Central African 
Republic 
CAF Nicaragua NIC 
Chile CHL Nigeria NGA 
China CHN Norway NOR  
Colombia COL Panama PAN 
Costa Rica CRI Paraguay PRY 
Cote D'Ivoire CIV Peru PER 
Denmark DNK Philippines PHL 
Dominican Republic DOM Poland POL 
Ecuador ECU Portugal PRT 
Egypt EGY Russia RUS 
El Salvador SLV Singapore SGP 
Finland FIN Spain ESP 
France FRA Sri Lanka LKA 
Germany DEU Sweden SWE 
Ghana GHA Taiwan TWN 
Greece GRC Thailand THA 
Guatemala GTM Tunisia TUN 
Honduras HND Turkey TUR 
Hungary HUN United Kingdom GBR 
Iceland ISL United States USA 
India IND Uruguay URY 
Indonesia IDN Venezuela VEN 
Italy ITA Zambia ZMB 
Japan JPN Zimbabwe ZWE 
Source: our elaboration. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 2. Runs test for the binary series of banking crises. 
Country Exact p-value 
P-value via 
approximation 
Country Exact p-value 
P-value via 
approximation 
DZA 0.0016 <0.0001 KEN <0.0001 0.0000 
AGO <0.0001 0.0000 KOR <0.0001 0.0000 
ARG <0.0001 <0.0001 MYS <0.0001 0.0000 
AUS <0.0001 <0.0001 MUS 0.0186 0.9228 
AUT 0.0023 <0.0001 MEX <0.0001 <0.0001 
BEL <0.0001 <0.0001 MAR 0.0187 <0.0001 
BOL 0.0002 <0.0001 MMR <0.0001 0.0000 
BRA 0.0002 <0.0001 NLD <0.0001 0.0000 
CAN 0.0014 <0.0001 NZL <0.0001 0.0000 
CAF <0.0001 0.0000 NIC <0.0001 0.0000 
CHL 0.0002 <0.0001 NGA <0.0001 0.0000 
CHN <0.0001 <0.0001 NOR  <0.0001 0.0000 
COL <0.0001 0.0000 PAN 0.0187 <0.0001 
CRI <0.0001 0.0000 PRY <0.0001 0.0000 
CIV <0.0001 0.0000 PER <0.0001 0.0000 
DNK <0.0001 <0.0001 PHL <0.0001 0.0000 
DOM 0.1106 0.0002 POL <0.0001 0.0000 
ECU <0.0001 0.0000 PRT <0.0001 <0.0001 
EGY <0.0001 0.0000 RUS <0.0001 <0.0001 
SLV 0.0016 <0.0001 SGP 0.0186 0.9228 
FIN 0.0023 <0.0001 ESP <0.0001 0.0000 
FRA <0.0001 <0.0001 LKA <0.0001 0.0000 
DEU <0.0001 <0.0001 SWE <0.0001 0.0000 
GHA <0.0001 0.0000 TWN 0.0023 <0.0001 
GRC <0.0001 0.0000 THA <0.0001 0.0000 
GTM 0.1101 0.8204 TUN <0.0001 0.0000 
HND 0.0558 <0.0001 TUR 0.0002 <0.0001 
HUN <0.0001 0.0000 GBR <0.0001 <0.0001 
ISL <0.0001 0.0000 USA <0.0001 <0.0001 
IND <0.0001 0.0000 URY <0.0001 0.0000 
IDN <0.0001 0.0000 VEN <0.0001 0.0000 
ITA <0.0001 <0.0001 ZMB <0.0001 0.0000 
JPN <0.0001 0.0000 ZWE <0.0001 0.0000 
Source: our elaboration. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    In order to measure the relationship between banking crises of two different countries, we used 
tetrachoric correlation coefficients. Since the correlation matrix in this case is very big (a 66 x 66 
matrix), we represented the data via a heatmap matrix computed over the whole period2. Figure 1 
shows the results of the correlation between the series, whereas Figure 2 is the matrix of the 
statistically significant coefficients associated to the matrix in Figure 1.   
   The principal features of the analysis can be synthesized as it follows: 
• the agreement between the series is for the most part positive; only few coefficients are 
negative and the most of these are not statistically significant. 
• Overall, we see that there is high positive correlation between banking crises in different 
countries. This means that if a coefficient between two countries, say A and B, is positive (and 
statistically significant), then banking crises in A are associated with banking crises in B, and 
vice versa (for example, the coefficient for DZA and AUS, or KOR and COL).  
• As it emerges from Figure 2, the relationship measured via tetrachoric correlation is for a large 
part of the coefficients significative. 
• The strength of correlation is independent from the geographical location of the considered 
couple of countries. This is evident from the matrix, since countries located in different 
Continents shows high and significative correlation (for example, the correlation between NIC 
and EGY, two distant countries, is high and significative at 1%), but we tested statistically 
this assumption via a chi-square test, considering in rows the degree of correlation (moderate3 
or strong) and in columns if the considered couple of countries were located in the same 
Continent or not4. The resulting p-value is about 0.3, which means that we cannot reject the 
hypothesis of independence.  
                                                          
2 Considering a shorter period would be counter-productive: first, because for inference, the more the data, the better 
the estimates; second, because computing such matrices is computationally expansive, therefore we opt for the most 
representative matrix; third, because banking crises are “rare” events, excluding precious observations from the analysis 
could affect the magnitude and the significance of the coefficients; finally, because more matrixes would occupy too 
much space in the paper without adding different point of views. 
3 A moderate correlation coefficient assumes values (in absolute terms) in the range [0,0.7[. 
4 This is a possible criterion of spatial proximity, simple but effective to consider the fact that countries in the same 
geographical area tend to exhibit similar financial and normative structures. 
 
Figure 1. Heatmap matrix for pairwise tetrachoric correlation coefficients between dichotomous time series for the 
whole time period. Source: our elaboration. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Matrix of the statistically significant correlation coefficients. * indicates a 10% significance, ** indicates a 5% 
significance, *** indicates a 1% significance, n.s. stands for”non-significant”. The main diagonal is indicated in red for 
visualisation purpose. Source: our elaboration. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   Finally, using clustering procedures we can visualise what groups of countries have been 
characterized by common events. Figure 3 shows the dendrogram for the 66 analysed countries over 
the whole period, using the Jaccard index as dissimilarity criterion and average linkage as aggregation 
method. From the dendrogram we can make interesting observations: we can see that Hungary and 
Greece have been characterized by the same path of events since their dissimilarity is zero; Greece is 
also closely related to Nigeria, whereas other strong similarities concern Polonia and Tunisia, Costa 
Rica and Nicaragua, Korea and Malaysia, Colombia and Philippines; Guatemala and Honduras form 
an isolated cluster and it should be noted that they are adjacent countries, while Singapore banking 
crises are not pooled to any other series; the light blue cluster is formed, except for Nigeria, by 
developed countries linked by political or economical relationships, furthermore, the majority of these 
countries are European; the cut-off threshold is very high, therefore almost all the groups are 
significative for the analysis.  
   It is interesting to see what clusters emerge if we consider the two major financial crises in 1929 
and in 2008. For the purpose, we divided the sample into two sub-sample: the first one covers banking 
crises from 1929 to 2006 and takes into account the effects of the Great Depression; the second one 
covers banking crises from 2006 to 2014 and takes into account the effects of the Great Recession. 
Figure 4 shows the dendrogram for the first sub-sample whereas Figure 5 shows the dendrogram for 
the second one. Some cluster is like the situation described by the dendrogram for the entire period 
(for example Greece-Hungary, Singapore or Dominican Republic-Mauritius-Myanmar), but the 
situation considering the impact only of the Great Depression is very different and the main 
characteristics can be synthesized as follows. First, we note that Austria, Germany, Portugal and 
France form now a cluster separated by the USA; second, the blue cluster shows that there is a strong 
similarity among countries located in the same geographical are. It is the case, for example, of 
Norway-Denmark, Italy-Egypt or Angola-Nigeria. These two facts prove that before the Great 
Recession, banking crises were “contagious”, but principally via a geographical criterion. After the 
Great Recession (Figure 5) it emerges a clear characteristic: banking crises now characterize countries 
tied by financial links. The dendrogram can be divided in two part: the first part, on the left, shows 
big cluster with no dissimilarity (the series is very short therefore several countries showed the same 
occurrence of events); the second part, on the right, shows a group formed for the most by European 
countries strictly related to USA.   
   A final distinction investigated in this paper regards the degree of financial liberalization. Since 
developing countries experienced an important series of reform about financial liberalization in the 
1990s (World Bank, 2005), we divided the series into two sub-series: one considers the years from 
1800 to 1990 and the second one the years after 1990 to assess the impact of financial liberalization. 
Figure 6 shows the dendrogram for the period before the principal reforms and Figure 7 the period 
after. Several important differences emerge from an analysis of the two dendrograms. Interestingly, 
after financial liberalization there is the formation of two big cluster (Figure 7) whereas before the 
series of reforms that interested the 1990s the situation was more mixed (Figure 6). After financial 
liberalization (Figure 7), there is a brown cluster that gathers, approximately, the major part of the 
developed countries (such as USA, France, Germany, UK or Italy etc.) whereas the major part 
emerging/developing countries (such as India, Indonesia, Taiwan or Mexico) are gathered by the grey 
cluster. 
 
 Figure 3. Dendrogram for the 66 banking crises series from 1800 to 2016. Measure of dissimilarity: Jaccard index. 
Aggregation method: average linkage. The dotted line is the cut-off threshold. Source: our elaboration. 
 
 
Figure 4. Dendrogram for the 66 banking crises series from 1929 to 2006. Measure of dissimilarity: Jaccard index. 
Aggregation method: average linkage. The dotted line is the cut-off threshold. Source: our elaboration. 
 
 Figure 5. Dendrogram for the 66 banking crises series from 2007 to 2014. Measure of dissimilarity: Jaccard index. 
Aggregation method: average linkage. The dotted line is the cut-off threshold. Source: our elaboration. 
 
 
Figure 6. Dendrogram for the 66 banking crises series from 1800 to 1990. Measure of dissimilarity: Jaccard index. 
Aggregation method: average linkage. The dotted line is the cut-off threshold. Source: our elaboration. 
 
 Figure 7 
Dendrogram for the 66 banking crises series from 1991 to 2014. Measure of dissimilarity: Jaccard index. Aggregation 
method: average linkage. The dotted line is the cut-off threshold. Source: our elaboration. 
 
4. Conclusions 
In this paper we provided further evidence in favour of cross-country correlation between banking 
crises. First, via runs tests we showed that the occurrence of banking crises does not follow a random 
path (except for Guatemala). The result, although obvious, is important to exclude the role of causality 
in explaining a correlation between banking crises in different countries. Second, we computed 
tetrachoric correlation for 66 countries suggesting that crises in different countries are associated. 
This result is particularly important because enlightens the fact that banking crises in different places 
may have the same determinants and that financial contagion is a concrete danger in a global 
economy. Our analysis seems reliable because we studied the phenomenon over more than 200 years, 
we tested properly the significance of the coefficients, via runs test we excluded any role of 
randomness in the crisis series and via the chi-square test we found that the intensity of correlation is 
not dependent from the fact that two countries are located in the same geographical area (Continent). 
Via the use of clustering analysis we found out that banking crises that interested developed countries 
(especially in Europe) tend to be closely linked as they form a clear cluster. This points out that at 
least for certain economic or political areas, the causes of the crises may be the same. Clustering 
analysis also enlightened the fact that after the Great Recession banking crises characterized countries 
tied by financial links (for the major part developed countries) whereas after financial liberalization 
clusters were formed based on a development criterion.  
   The role of regulation is crucial for the issue. For example, Gluzmann and Guzman (2017) showed 
that liberalization reforms (concerning capital accounts, securities markets, interest rates, removal of 
credit controls, barriers to entry, and reduction of state ownership in the banking sector) in emerging 
economies were directly associated with a higher frequency of banking crises. Freixas, Laeven and 
Peydrò (2015) emphasized the role of macro-prudential policies in preventing the occurrence of 
financial crisis. These measures become indispensably to reduce the likelihood of banking crises 
because financial liberalization increased cross-border banking activities whereas financial 
globalization weakened the effectiveness of domestic policies, even though other studies found out 
that a greater banking sector globalization and financial liberalization diminish the likelihood of a 
banking crisis (Shehzad and Haan, 2009; Ghosh, 2016). Future researches should deepen our 
knowledge about the common causes of banking crises and how the process of contagion spreads 
from one country to another.  
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